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The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
AuthorSamuel P. Huntington
LanguageEnglish
PublisherSimon & Schuster
Publication date
1996
Publication placeUnited States
ISBN978-0-684-84441-1

The "Clash of Civilizations" is a thesis that people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post–Cold War world.[1][2][3][4][5] The American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington argued that future wars would be fought not between countries, but between cultures.[1][6] It was proposed in a 1992 lecture at the American Enterprise Institute, which was then developed in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article titled "The Clash of Civilizations?",[7] in response to his former student Francis Fukuyama's 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man. Huntington later expanded his thesis in a 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.[8]

The phrase itself was earlier used by Albert Camus in 1946,[9] by Girilal Jain in his analysis of the Ayodhya dispute in 1988,[10][11] by Bernard Lewis in an article in the September 1990 issue of The Atlantic Monthly titled "The Roots of Muslim Rage"[12] and by Mahdi El Mandjra in his book "La première guerre civilisationnelle" published in 1992.[13][14] Even earlier, the phrase appears in a 1926 book regarding the Middle East by Basil Mathews: Young Islam on Trek: A Study in the Clash of Civilizations (p. 196). This expression derives from "clash of cultures", already used during the colonial period and the Belle Époque.[15]

Huntington began his thinking by surveying the diverse theories about the nature of global politics in the post–Cold War period. Some theorists and writers argued that human rights, liberal democracy, and the capitalist free market economy had become the only remaining ideological alternative for nations in the post–Cold War world. Specifically, Francis Fukuyama argued that the world had reached the 'end of history' in a Hegelian sense.

Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world had only reverted to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. In his thesis, he argued that the primary axis of conflict in the future will be along cultural lines.[16] As an extension, he posits that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest category of cultural identity, will become increasingly useful in analyzing the potential for conflict. At the end of his 1993 Foreign Affairs article, "The Clash of Civilizations?", Huntington writes, "This is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civilizations. It is to set forth descriptive hypothesis as to what the future may be like."[7]

In addition, the clash of civilizations, for Huntington, represents a development of history. In the past, world history was mainly about the struggles between monarchs, nations and ideologies, such as that seen within Western civilization. However, after the end of the Cold War, world politics moved into a new phase, in which non-Western civilizations are no longer the exploited recipients of Western civilization but have become additional important actors joining the West to shape and move world history.[17]

Major civilizations according to Huntington

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The clash of civilizations according to Huntington (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order[18]

Huntington divided the world into the "major civilizations" in his thesis as such:[19][2]

Huntington's thesis of civilizational clash

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Huntington at the 2004 World Economic Forum

Huntington argues that the trends of global conflict after the end of the Cold War are increasingly appearing at these civilizational divisions. Wars such as those following the break up of Yugoslavia, in Chechnya, and between India and Pakistan were cited as evidence of inter-civilizational conflict. He also argues that the widespread Western belief in the universality of the West's values and political systems is naïve and that continued insistence on democratization and such "universal" norms will only further antagonize other civilizations. Huntington sees the West as reluctant to accept this because it built the international system, wrote its laws, and gave it substance in the form of the United Nations.

Huntington identifies a major shift of economic, military, and political power from the West to the other civilizations of the world, most significantly to what he identifies as the two "challenger civilizations", Sinic and Islam.

In Huntington's view, East Asian Sinic civilization is culturally asserting itself and its values relative to the West due to its rapid economic growth. Specifically, he believes that China's goals are to reassert itself as the regional hegemon, and that other countries in the region will 'bandwagon' with China due to the history of hierarchical command structures implicit in the Confucian Sinic civilization, as opposed to the individualism and pluralism valued in the West. Regional powers such as the two Koreas and Vietnam will acquiesce to Chinese demands and become more supportive of China rather than attempting to oppose it. Huntington therefore believes that the rise of China poses one of the most significant problems and the most powerful long-term threat to the West, as Chinese cultural assertion clashes with the American desire for the lack of a regional hegemony in East Asia.[citation needed]

Huntington argues that the Islamic civilization has experienced a massive population explosion which is fueling instability both on the borders of Islam and in its interior, where fundamentalist movements are becoming increasingly popular. Manifestations of what he terms the "Islamic Resurgence" include the 1979 Iranian revolution and the first Gulf War. Perhaps the most controversial statement Huntington made in the Foreign Affairs article was that "Islam has bloody borders". Huntington believes this to be a real consequence of several factors, including the previously mentioned Muslim youth bulge and population growth and Islamic proximity to many civilizations including Sinic, Orthodox, Western, and African.

Huntington sees Islamic civilization as a potential ally to China, both having more revisionist goals and sharing common conflicts with other civilizations, especially the West. Specifically, he identifies common Chinese and Islamic interests in the areas of weapons proliferation, human rights, and democracy that conflict with those of the West, and feels that these are areas in which the two civilizations will cooperate.

Russia, Japan, and India are what Huntington terms 'swing civilizations' and may favor either side. Russia, for example, clashes with the many Muslim ethnic groups on its southern border (such as Chechnya) but—according to Huntington—cooperates with Iran to avoid further Muslim-Orthodox violence in Southern Russia, and to help continue the flow of oil. Huntington argues that a "Sino-Islamic connection" is emerging in which China will cooperate more closely with Iran, Pakistan, and other states to augment its international position.

Huntington also argues that civilizational conflicts are "particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims", identifying the "bloody borders" between Islamic and non-Islamic civilizations. This conflict dates back as far as the initial thrust of Islam into Europe, its eventual expulsion in the Iberian reconquest, the attacks of the Ottoman Turks on Eastern Europe and Vienna, and the European imperial division of the Islamic nations in the 1800s and 1900s.

Huntington also believes that some of the factors contributing to this conflict are that both Christianity (upon which Western civilization is based) and Islam are:

  • Missionary religions, seeking conversion of others
  • Universal, "all-or-nothing" religions, in the sense that it is believed by both sides that only their faith is the correct one
  • Teleological religions, that is, that their values and beliefs represent the goals of existence and purpose in human existence.

More recent factors contributing to a Western–Islamic clash, Huntington wrote, are the Islamic Resurgence and demographic explosion in Islam, coupled with the values of Western universalism—that is, the view that all civilizations should adopt Western values—that infuriate Islamic fundamentalists. All these historical and modern factors combined, Huntington wrote briefly in his Foreign Affairs article and in much more detail in his 1996 book, would lead to a bloody clash between the Islamic and Western civilizations.

Why civilizations will clash

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Huntington offers six explanations for why civilizations will clash:

  1. Differences among civilizations are too basic in that civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition, and, most importantly, religion. These fundamental differences are the product of centuries and the foundations of different civilizations, meaning they will not be gone soon.
  2. The world is becoming a smaller place. As a result, interactions across the world are increasing, which intensify "civilization consciousness" and the awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations.
  3. Due to economic modernization and social change, people are separated from longstanding local identities. Instead, religion has replaced this gap, which provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations.
  4. The growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, a return-to-the-roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Western countries that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.
  5. Cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones.
  6. Economic regionalism is increasing. Successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. Economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization.

The West versus the Rest

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Huntington suggests that in the future the central axis of world politics tends to be the conflict between Western and non-Western civilizations, in Stuart Hall's phrase, the conflict between "the West and the Rest". He offers three forms of general and fundamental actions that non-Western civilization can take in response to Western countries.[21]

  1. Non-Western countries can attempt to achieve isolation in order to preserve their own values and protect themselves from Western invasion. However, Huntington argues that the costs of this action are high and only a few states can pursue it.
  2. According to the theory of "band-wagoning", non-Western countries can join and accept Western values.
  3. Non-Western countries can make an effort to balance Western power through modernization. They can develop economic/military power and cooperate with other non-Western countries against the West while still preserving their own values and institutions. Huntington believes that the increasing power of non-Western civilizations in international society will make the West begin to develop a better understanding of the cultural fundamentals underlying other civilizations. Therefore, Western civilization will cease to be regarded as "universal" but different civilizations will learn to coexist and join to shape the future world.

Core state and fault line conflicts

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In Huntington's view, intercivilizational conflict manifests itself in two forms: fault line conflicts and core state conflicts.

Fault line conflicts are on a local level and occur between adjacent states belonging to different civilizations or within states that are home to populations from different civilizations.

Core state conflicts are on a global level between the major states of different civilizations. Core state conflicts can arise out of fault line conflicts when core states become involved.[22]

These conflicts may result from a number of causes, such as: relative influence or power (military or economic), discrimination against people from a different civilization, intervention to protect kinsmen in a different civilization, or different values and culture, particularly when one civilization attempts to impose its values on people of a different civilization.[22]

Modernization, Westernization, and "torn countries"

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Japan, China and the Four Asian Tigers have modernized in many respects while maintaining traditional or authoritarian societies which distinguish them from the West. Some of these countries have clashed with the West and some have not.

Perhaps the ultimate example of non-Western modernization is Russia, the core state of the Orthodox civilization. Huntington argues that Russia is primarily a non-Western state although he seems to agree that it shares a considerable amount of cultural ancestry with the modern West. According to Huntington, the West is distinguished from Orthodox Christian countries by its experience of the Renaissance, Reformation, the Enlightenment; by overseas colonialism rather than contiguous expansion and colonialism; and by the infusion of Classical culture through ancient Greece rather than through the continuous trajectory of the Byzantine Empire.

Huntington refers to countries that are seeking to affiliate with another civilization as "torn countries". Turkey, whose political leadership has systematically tried to Westernize the country since the 1920s, is his chief example. Turkey's history, culture, and traditions are derived from Islamic civilization, but Turkey's elite, beginning with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who took power as first President in 1923, imposed Western institutions and dress, embraced the Latin alphabet, joined NATO, and has sought to join the European Union.

Mexico and Russia are also considered to be torn by Huntington. He also gives the example of Australia as a country torn between its Western civilizational heritage and its growing economic engagement with Asia.

According to Huntington, a torn country must meet three requirements to redefine its civilizational identity. Its political and economic elite must support the move. Second, the public must be willing to accept the redefinition. Third, the elites of the civilization that the torn country is trying to join must accept the country.

The book claims that to date no torn country has successfully redefined its civilizational identity, this mostly due to the elites of the 'host' civilization refusing to accept the torn country, though if Turkey gained membership in the European Union, it has been noted that many of its people would support Westernization, as in the following quote by EU Minister Egemen Bağış: "This is what Europe needs to do: they need to say that when Turkey fulfills all requirements, Turkey will become a member of the EU on date X. Then, we will regain the Turkish public opinion support in one day."[23] If this were to happen, it would, according to Huntington, be the first to redefine its civilizational identity.

Criticism

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The book has been criticized by various academic writers, who have empirically, historically, logically, or ideologically challenged its claims.[24][25][26][27] Political scientist Paul Musgrave writes that Clash of Civilization "enjoys great cachet among the sort of policymaker who enjoys name-dropping Sun Tzu, but few specialists in international relations rely on it or even cite it approvingly. Bluntly, Clash has not proven to be a useful or accurate guide to understanding the world."[28]

In an article explicitly referring to Huntington, scholar Amartya Sen (1999) argues that "diversity is a feature of most cultures in the world. Western civilization is no exception. The practice of democracy that has won out in the modern West is largely a result of a consensus that has emerged since the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, and particularly in the last century or so. To read in this a historical commitment of the West—over the millennia—to democracy, and then to contrast it with non-Western traditions (treating each as monolithic) would be a great mistake."[29]: 16 

In his 2003 book Terror and Liberalism, Paul Berman argues that distinct cultural boundaries do not exist in the present day. He argues there is no "Islamic civilization" nor a "Western civilization", and that the evidence for a civilization clash is not convincing, especially when considering relationships such as that between the United States and Saudi Arabia. In addition, he cites the fact that many Islamic extremists spent a significant amount of time living or studying in the Western world. According to Berman, conflict arises because of philosophical beliefs various groups share (or do not share), regardless of cultural or religious identity.[30]

Timothy Garton Ash objects to the 'extreme cultural determinism... crude to the point of parody' of Huntington's idea that Catholic and Protestant Europe is headed for democracy, but that Orthodox Christian and Islamic Europe must accept dictatorship.[31]

Edward Said issued a response to Huntington's thesis in his 2001 article, "The Clash of Ignorance".[32] Said argues that Huntington's categorization of the world's fixed "civilizations" omits the dynamic interdependency and interaction of culture. A longtime critic of the Huntingtonian paradigm, and an outspoken proponent of Arab issues, Said (2004) also argues that the clash of civilizations thesis is an example of "the purest invidious racism, a sort of parody of Hitlerian science directed today against Arabs and Muslims" (p. 293).[33]

Noam Chomsky has criticized the concept of the clash of civilizations as just being a new justification for the United States "for any atrocities that they wanted to carry out", which was required after the Cold War as the Soviet Union was no longer a viable threat.[34]

In 21 Lessons for the 21st Century, Yuval Noah Harari called the clash of civilizations a misleading thesis. He wrote that Islamic fundamentalism is more of a threat to a global civilization, rather than a confrontation with the West. He also argued that talking about civilizations using analogies from evolutionary biology is wrong.[35]

Nathan J. Robinson criticizes Huntington's thesis as inconsistent. He notes that according to Huntington, "Spanish-speaking Catholic-majority Spain is West, while Spanish-speaking Catholic-majority Mexico is not part of Western civilization, and instead belongs with Brazil as part of Latin American civilization." Robinson concludes, "If you look at the map and think these divisions make sense, which you might, it is because what you are mostly seeing here is a map of prejudices. [Huntington] indeed shows how a lot of people think of the world, especially in America."[36]

Intermediate Region

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Huntington's geopolitical model, especially the structures for North Africa and Eurasia, is largely derived from the "Intermediate Region" geopolitical model first formulated by Dimitri Kitsikis and published in 1978.[37] The Intermediate Region, which spans the Adriatic Sea and the Indus River, is neither Western nor Eastern (at least, with respect to the Far East) but is considered distinct. Concerning this region, Huntington departs from Kitsikis contending that a civilizational fault line exists between the two dominant yet differing religions (Eastern Orthodoxy and Sunni Islam), hence a dynamic of external conflict. However, Kitsikis establishes an integrated civilization comprising these two peoples along with those belonging to the less dominant religions of Shia Islam, Alevism, and Judaism. They have a set of mutual cultural, social, economic and political views and norms which radically differ from those in the West and the Far East. In the Intermediate Region, therefore, one cannot speak of a civilizational clash or external conflict, but rather an internal conflict, not for cultural domination, but for political succession. This has been successfully demonstrated by documenting the rise of Christianity from the Hellenized Roman Empire, the rise of the Islamic caliphates from the Christianized Roman Empire and the rise of Ottoman rule from the Islamic caliphates and the Christianized Roman Empire.

Mohammad Khatami, reformist president of Iran (in office 1997–2005), introduced the theory of Dialogue Among Civilizations as a response to Huntington's theory.

Opposing concepts

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In recent years, the theory of Dialogue Among Civilizations, a response to Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, has become the center of some international attention. The concept was originally coined by Austrian philosopher Hans Köchler in an essay on cultural identity (1972).[38] In a letter to UNESCO, Köchler had earlier proposed that the cultural organization of the United Nations should take up the issue of a "dialogue between different civilizations" (dialogue entre les différentes civilisations).[39] In 2001, Iranian president Mohammad Khatami introduced the concept at the global level. At his initiative, the United Nations proclaimed the year 2001 as the "United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations".[40][41][42]

The Alliance of Civilizations (AOC) initiative was proposed at the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations in 2005 by the Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and co-sponsored by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The initiative is intended to galvanize collective action across diverse societies to combat extremism, to overcome cultural and social barriers between mainly the Western and predominantly Muslim worlds, and to reduce the tensions and polarization between societies which differ in religious and cultural values.

Other civilizational models

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Individuals

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See also

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References

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  1. ^ a b Huntington, Samuel P. (1993). "The Clash of Civilizations?". Foreign Affairs. 72 (3): 22–49. doi:10.2307/20045621. ISSN 0015-7120. JSTOR 20045621.
  2. ^ a b "gbse.com.my" (PDF). gbse.com.my. Retrieved September 9, 2023.
  3. ^ Emily, Stacey (October 29, 2021). Contemporary Politics and Social Movements in an Isolated World: Emerging Research and Opportunities: Emerging Research and Opportunities. IGI Global. ISBN 978-1-7998-7616-8.
  4. ^ Eriksen, Thomas Hylland; Garsten, Christina; Randeria, Shalini (October 1, 2014). Anthropology Now and Next: Essays in Honor of Ulf Hannerz. Berghahn Books. ISBN 978-1-78238-450-2.
  5. ^ Krieger, Douglas W. (November 22, 2014). The Two Witnesses. Lulu Press, Inc. ISBN 978-1-312-67075-4.[permanent dead link]
  6. ^ Haynes, Jeffrey (May 11, 2021). A Quarter Century of the "Clash of Civilizations". Routledge. ISBN 978-1-000-38383-6.
  7. ^ a b Official copy (free preview): The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993
  8. ^ "WashingtonPost.com: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order". The Washington Post.
  9. ^

    le problème russo-américain, et là nous revenons à l'Algérie, va être dépassé lui-même avant très peu, cela ne sera pas un choc d'empires nous assistons au choc de civilisations et nous voyons dans le monde entier les civilisations colonisées surgir peu à peu et se dresser contre les civilisations colonisatrices.

    "Page non trouvée | INA". Archived from the original on September 24, 2015. Retrieved July 14, 2015.
  10. ^ Elst, Koenraad. ""Some recollections from my acquaintance with Sita Ram Goel", ch.6 of K. Elst, ed.: India's Only Communalist, In Commemoration of Sita Ram Goel". Retrieved October 23, 2022 – via www.academia.edu.
  11. ^ Elst, K. India's Only Communalist: an Introduction to the Work of Sita Ram Goel, in Sharma, A. (2001). Hinduism and secularism: After Ayodhya. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
  12. ^ Bernard Lewis: The Roots of Muslim Rage The Atlantic Monthly, September 1990
  13. ^ Elmandjra, Mahdi (1992). Première guerre civilisationnelle (in French). Toubkal.
  14. ^ Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (1996), p. 246: " 'La premiere guerre civilisationnelle' the distinguished Moroccan scholar Mahdi Elmandjra called the Gulf War as it was being fought."
  15. ^ Louis Massignon, La psychologie musulmane (1931), in Idem, Ecrits mémorables, t. I, Paris, Robert Laffont, 2009, p. 629: "Après la venue de Bonaparte au Caire, le clash of cultures entre l'ancienne Chrétienté et l'Islam prit un nouvel aspect, par invasion (sans échange) de l'échelle de valeurs occidentales dans la mentalité collective musulmane."
  16. ^ mehbaliyev (October 30, 2010). "Civilizations, their nature and clash possibilities (c) Rashad Mehbal..."
  17. ^ Murden S. Cultures in world affairs. In: Baylis J, Smith S, Owens P, editors. The Globalization of World Politics. 5th ed. New York: Oxford University Press; 2011. p. 416-426.
  18. ^ THE WORLD OF CIVILIZATIONS: POST-1990 scanned image Archived March 12, 2007, at the Wayback Machine
  19. ^ Walter, Natalie (June 15, 2016). "Summary of "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order"". Beyond Intractability. Retrieved October 28, 2021.
  20. ^ ""western christianity" "western world" - Google Search". google.com. Retrieved September 9, 2017.
  21. ^ Hungtington SP, The Clash of Civilizations? In: Lechner FJ, Boli J, editors. The globalization reader. 4th ed. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell; 2012. 37–44
  22. ^ a b Huntington, Samuel P. (2002) [1997]. "Chapter 9: The Global Politics of Civilizations". The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (The Free Press ed.). London: Simon $ Schuster. p. 207f. ISBN 978-0-7432-3149-7.
  23. ^ Bağış: Fransa'nın tutumunda değişimin başladığını görüyoruz | AB ve Türkiye | EurActiv.com.tr Archived January 9, 2016, at the Wayback Machine
  24. ^ Fox, J. (2005). Paradigm Lost: Huntington's Unfulfilled Clash of Civilizations Prediction into the 21st Century. International Politics, 42, pp. 428–457.
  25. ^ Mungiu-Pippidi, A., & Mindruta, D. (2002). Was Huntington Right? Testing Cultural Legacies and the Civilization Border. International Politics, 39(2), pp. 193 213.
  26. ^ Henderson, E. A., & Tucker, R. (2001). Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict. International Studies Quarterly, 45, pp. 317 338.
  27. ^ Russett, B. M.; Oneal, J. R.; Cox, M. (2000). "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence" (PDF). Journal of Peace Research. 37 (5): 583–608. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.460.7212. doi:10.1177/0022343300037005003. S2CID 51897336.
  28. ^ "H-Diplo/ISSF Teaching Roundtable 11-6 on The Clash of Civilizations in the IR Classroom | H-Diplo | H-Net". networks.h-net.org. Retrieved November 7, 2019.
  29. ^ Sen A (1999). "Democracy as a Universal Value". Journal of Democracy. 10 (3): 3–17. doi:10.1353/jod.1999.0055. S2CID 54556373.
  30. ^ Berman, Paul (2003). Terror and Liberalism. W W Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-05775-5.
  31. ^ Timothy Garton Ash, History of the Present, Penguin, 2000, p 388-389
  32. ^ Edward Said: The Clash of Ignorance The Nation, October 2001
  33. ^ Said, E. W. (2004). From Oslo to Iraq and the Road Map. New York: Pantheon, 2004.
  34. ^ TrystanCJ (March 2, 2007), Noam Chomsky on The "Clash of Civilizations", archived from the original on November 17, 2021, retrieved October 31, 2018
  35. ^ Harari, Yuval N. (2018). 21 lessons for the 21st century (First ed.). New York. ISBN 978-0-525-51217-2. OCLC 1029771757.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  36. ^ Robinson, Nathan J. (March 31, 2022). "The "Clash of Civilizations" Thesis Is Still Ignorant Nonsense". Current Affairs. ISSN 2471-2647. Retrieved October 15, 2024.
  37. ^ Dimitri Kitsikis, A Comparative History of Greece and Turkey in the 20th century. In Greek, Συγκριτική Ἱστορία Ἑλλάδος καί Τουρκίας στόν 20ό αἰῶνα, Athens, Hestia, 1978. Supplemented 2nd edition: Hestia, 1990. 3rd edition: Hestia, 1998, 357 pp.. In Turkish, Yırmı Asırda Karşılaştırmalı Türk-Yunan Tarihi, İstanbul, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Dergisi, II-8, 1980.
  38. ^ "Kulturelles Selbstverständnis und Koexistenz: Voraussetzungen für einen fundamentalen Dialog" (Cultural Identity and Co-existence: Preconditions for a Fundamental Dialogue). Public lecture delivered at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, 19 October 1972, published in: Philosophie und Politik. Dokumentation eines interdisziplinären Seminars. (Publications of the Working Group for Science and Politics at the University of Innsbruck, Vol. IV.) Innsbruck: Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Wissenschaft und Politik, 1973, pp. 75-78.
  39. ^ Letter dated 26 September 1972, addressed to the Division of Philosophy of UNESCO.
  40. ^ Dialogue 2001 Archived February 16, 2003, at the Wayback Machine Unesco.org Retrieved on 05-24-07
  41. ^ About Dialoguecentre.org Retrieved 05-24-07
  42. ^ "Dialogue Among Civilizations | United Nations University". archive.unu.edu. Retrieved October 23, 2022.

Bibliography

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Further reading

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Media related to Clash of civilizations at Wikimedia Commons

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